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INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR MEDICARE
OVERPAYMENT CLAIMS
By David P Parker and James Hennelly*
I. SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE
This article addresses the case where an individual
or "natural person" owns an interest in a Medicare
health care provider that is incorporated under
state law as a corporation, limited liability company
("LLC"), limited partnership ("LP"), or another type
of legal person. The individual may be a shareholder,
member, limited partner, or some corresponding
term for an owner of the company, but in all these
cases the common factor is limitation of liability of
owners.
Owners of providers facing Zone Program Integrity
Contractors ("ZPIC")2 or other Medicare contractor
audits or appealing an overpayment demand often
ask what risk they face of being held personally liable
for the overpayment claims, or otherwise punished
personally, if their appeals are unsuccessful. This
article uses a hypothetical to explain the extent
of such owners' personal liability as a result of a
Medicare overpayment claim.*
II. DEFINITION OF OUR CASE
Consider a common scenario in which a provider
organized as a corporation or LLC (the "Company")
with one or more individual owners (i.e. individual
"shareholders" or "members") is enrolled with
Medicare, has provided services to Medicare
beneficiaries over a substantial period of time,
and has received payments from the Medicare
contractor. A ZPIC or other contractor, such as a
Medicare Recovery Audit Contractor ("RAC")3
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or a Comprehensive Error Rate Testing ("CERT")
contractor,4 then selects the Company for post-
payment audit. After reviewing a sample of records,
the contractor determines that overpayments have
occurred and issues an audit results letter assessing
an amount it claims Medicare overpaid in the
sample. The contractor also assesses a much larger
extrapolated amount it deems Medicare overpaid in
all of the Company's Medicare receipts during the
period under review. The Medicare Administrative
Contractor ("MAC") then makes a written
formal demand for refund by the Company of the
extrapolated amount.
Assume further that the Company either fails to
appeal this overpayment determination, referred to
as an "Initial Determination," or appeals and loses.
Either way, the Company owes the full extrapolated
amount to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services ("CMS"), plus interest that begins to accrue
thirty days from the date of the formal demand by the
MAC. Also assume that this sum amounts to several
years of gross revenues for the Company, and it has
no means to repay it. The MAC begins to recoup
payments of new Medicare billings by the Company,
and the Company shuts down as it exhausts its funds
available to cover payroll and operating expenses.
Finally, assume, as is commonly the case, that the
Company has no significant assets that CMS can
seize and liquidate to satisfy the overpayment.
Thus, the primary issue is whether the Company's
individual owner or owners are on the hook for the
unpaid amount of the CMS overpayment claim. A
related issue is the potential for liability of other
provider entities owned by the same individuals. In
other words, under what circumstances can CMS
or its contractors lawfully collect the overpayment
from the individual owners or their other provider
companies? What other sanctions can the government
apply against the individuals and affiliates in such a
case?
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III. CONCEPT OF LIMITED LIABILITY
In the United States and most Western legal systems
the concept of incorporation of a business is available
to shield its owners from claims for the business's
debts. This is the concept of "limited liability,"
meaning the owners' personal liability for the debts
of the business is usually limited to the amount of the
capital they have invested in it. If the business owes
money to a creditor, the creditor will have recourse
to the business, meaning the money and other assets
the business itself owns. In this way, the creditor can
collect the capital the owner has bound up in the
business, but the creditor has no right to make the
owner pay from his own assets.
IV. THRESHOLD RULE OF LIMITED
LIABILITY; EXCEPTIONS AND
"PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL"
The general rule of limited liability applies to CMS
and its contractors when dealing with shareholders of
incorporated health care providers, just as it does to
other creditors. No statute or case law makes owners
of incorporated health care providers personally
liable for their companies' debts to CMS, except in
certain very narrow circumstances that apply to all
debtors and creditors. These circumstances are no
more likely to arise in the health care industry than
elsewhere.
The principal exceptions to the rule of limited
liability of shareholders are collectively known
as "piercing the corporate veil." Under certain
circumstances, courts will allow creditors of an
insolvent corporation, LLC, or other legal entity to
reach through the corporate structure and collect
their debts from shareholders or similar owners. 5
Notably, however, CMS and its contractors rarely
seek to pierce the corporate veil, as courts tend to
disfavor the practice and narrowly interpret common
law governing the area. While an exhaustive
discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this
article, courts have cited numerous factors to justify
imposing liability on shareholders for corporate
debts, including the following:
A. Defective Incorporation
Failure to meet legal statutory requirements for
organizing the corporation or LLC can and will
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result in shareholders being liable for corporate
debts. Without compliance with the requirements for
incorporation, no corporation ever exists in the first
place to shield the shareholders from liability.
B. Ignoring the Separateness of the Corporation
Entering into contracts and otherwise transacting
business variously in a corporate name and an
individual name can justify piercing the corporate
veil. Likewise, commingling corporate and individual
assets, or transferring assets without formalities
between company and owner, or company and a
sister company, can yield the same result.
C. Significant Undercapitalization
A corporation must have a reasonably sufficient
amount of capital to pay its expected debts.
Failure to do so is grounds to impose liability on
the shareholders. Undercapitalization is normally
difficult to prove, as courts determine the adequacy
of capital at the time it is injected, not when the
liability arises. Further, courts tend to defer to any
good-faith estimate of how much capital will be
needed.
D. Excessive Dividends or Other Payments to
Shareholders
When owners are actually working for a corporation
they can in most cases pay themselves whatever
compensation is even remotely fair, as long as it is
clearly characterized as salary or wages. Dividends
and other non-compensation distributions, however,
are judged very differently, and can safely be
taken out by shareholders only to the extent of
profits. When shareholders take non-compensation
distributions in excess of profits, these distributions
constitute a return of capital and can give rise to an
undercapitalization claim by any corporate creditor
who is subsequently not paid.' If such distributions
are made when the corporation is actually insolvent,
the creditors' claims against the shareholders will be
almost impossible to defend.
E. Misrepresentation and other Unfair Dealings
with Creditors
Dishonesty and false statements to corporate
creditors, asset concealment, and other deceptive
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practices can make shareholders liable for corporate
debts.
F. Absence or Inaccuracy of Records
If corporate records go missing or prove to be
inaccurate, they can form a basis to pierce the
corporate veil, especially if they hinder a creditor's
collection efforts against the corporation.
G. Failure to Maintain Ongoing Legal
Requirements
Each state's statutes impose annual franchise
fees and various report-filing requirements on
corporations and similar entities. Although these
have generous grace periods and cure provisions,
if they are neglected long enough, the corporation
or LLC will legally cease to exist and shareholder
liability will result.'
Given any of the above factors, CMS and its Medicare
contractors can seek to pierce the Company's
corporate veil and collect the overpayment from the
Company's owners. These circumstances, however,
are not typical for health care providers and are easily
avoided. Veil piercing depends on facts that by their
nature are difficult to prove in a court of law, often
involve subjective judgments, and in most cases are
subject to dispute. The burden of proving the facts is
always on the creditor. Correspondingly, courts tend
to disfavor veil piercing claims and narrowly construe
the applicable law, so veil piercing has a reputation
as a difficult remedy to invoke successfully.
V. RULES IN BANKRUPTCY
While CMS enjoys certain advantages and unique
rights under U.S. bankruptcy laws, it does not have
any advantage over other creditors in reaching the
pockets of shareholders of a bankrupt company.
A basic rule in bankruptcy is that filing a petition
automatically halts or "stays" all acts by creditors
to collect debts which pre-date the petition.' Since
2005, this "automatic stay" has been ruled not to
impair CMS's right to exclude providers from its
programs.9 Additionally, federal case law appears to
hold that the automatic stay does not prevent CMS
and its contractors from recoupment against new
Medicare billings by a provider in bankruptcy.10 But
no bankruptcy law gives Federal health care programs
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special debt collection rights against shareholders
of providers, so CMS and its contractors, like other
creditors, can collect Medicare overpayments from
shareholders and other owners of a bankrupt entity
only in the veil piercing circumstances described
above, which are narrowly-drawn and strictly
interpreted against the creditor.
VI. FEDERAL AGENCY PRACTICE ON
PURSUING INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
Federal agencies are not as a rule aggressive
in collection of their debt claims, and CMS is
no exception. For example, in government loan
programs where shareholders are required personally
to guarantee the debt, once corporate assets are
exhausted in default cases, federal agencies rarely
pursue the guarantors' personal credit and discourage
their contractors and even private holders of
government-guaranteed loans from doing so.II With
this in mind, it should be no surprise that most federal
agencies seldom if ever seek to pierce any corporate
veil.' 2 As noted, veil piercing is difficult because
it involves many ambiguities and is dependent on
individual facts and circumstances; government
agencies are reluctant to risk the time and resources
required. Government agencies also fear the adverse
publicity that regularly arises from collection efforts
against individuals. While federal authorities might
pursue such remedies in an extreme case or under
the glare of unusual publicity, they are otherwise
unlikely to do so. 13
VII. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
The individual owners in the hypothetical will not be
able to continue in the health care industry using the
Company itself as a practice vehicle. They may wish
to organize and capitalize another entity to provide
the same or a similar type of services. In what
circumstances can new entities organized by the
owners after the Company's demise be held liable for
the Company's overpayment obligation? This area of
the law is referred to as "successor liability," and it
provides remedies that allow creditors to pursue the
new entity in some cases. Like veil piercing, this
remedy is an exception to the general rule of limited
liability of corporate owners, is available to creditors
in certain narrow circumstances, and is not specific
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to government creditors or health care provider
debtors.
Successor liability flows from state statutes and
state court case rulings that allow the creditors of
a debtor company to collect their debt claims from
another company to which one or more assets of
the debtor have been transferred, if it is a successor
to the original debtor. The exact circumstances that
make the other company a successor vary from
state to state. In most states the law gives a list of
elements that can establish successor status, but uses
a balancing test, meaning there is no concrete rule
of which or how many elements must be satisfied
to prove a claim. The creditor sues the transferee
company to initiate such a claim, and the court
hearing the case decides not only which elements are
present, but also whether they are enough to make
the defendant a successor.' 4 But if a creditor can
prove enough of them, it can obligate the transferee
to pay the debt.
Elements commonly listed to impose liability on the
transferee of a debtor's assets include (i) common
ownership (whole or part) between the original
debtor and the separate company; (ii) the transferee
was established to hinder the creditors of the debtor;
(iii) the original debtor and the transferee company
provide the same goods or services; (iv) the same
or recognizably similar company name or DBA;
(v) same business location; (vi) same customers or
customer sources; (vii) same officers or managers;
(viii) same employees; and (ix) the transferee pays
other debts of the original debtor, or states that it will
do so. In most cases, one or two elements alone will
usually be insufficient to establish liability.'5
Successor liability is not as uniformly disfavored
in courts as veil piercing but remains uncommon
in practice. Like veil piercing, it is rarely used by
federal agencies and contractors. Whether any
specific circumstances will make a transferee
company liable as a successor to another is
beyond the scope of this article; nonetheless, asset
transfers between commonly-owned companies
occur frequently yet may not easily be identifiable
as such to a non-lawyer. In the hypothetical, the
Company's owners may be sorely tempted to use
the same business location or same employees or
managers in the new provider as in the Company,
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and may wish to have the new entity collect
unpaid receiveables. Any of these steps could
subject the new entity to the overpayment, or to
any other creditor claim. Successor liability can
be invoked against pre-existing entities under
common ownership with the Company as well.
Owners of health care providers having other
companies subject to any Medicare contractor
collection action need to avoid any such transfers
scrupulously. They can make their other provider
liable in common for an overpayment claim.
VIII. OTHER GOVERNMENT
SANCTIONS AGAINST OWNERS AND
AFFILIATES FOR NON-PAYMENT BY AN
INCORPORATED PROVIDER
Pursuing owners personally for repayment of a
provider's overpayment liability isn't the only
sanction CMS and its contractors might logically
seek to apply to punish non-payment. Excluding
related persons and companies from health care
program participation comes to mind. This could
take at least three forms, each of which we will
examine in turn.
A. Exclusion of Individual Owners
The authority for HHS to exclude both companies
and individuals from involvement in its health
care programs has been established at the statute,
regulation, and policy manual levels.
The basic authority for exclusion is granted to
the Secretary of HHS under Sections 1128 and
1156 of the Social Security Act. 16 These sections
list all the grounds for which a party may be
excluded.17 Most of these sections are written so
that if an entity commits acts that are grounds
for exclusion, the owners are likewise at risk.'
Most of the grounds for exclusion are not relevant
here, such as conviction for felonies, or health
care related misdemeanors. Three grounds for
exclusion, however, relate to providers' services,
namely submitting charges to any Federal health
care program in excess of the provider's usual
charges, furnishing services in excess of the needs
of patients, and furnishing services of a quality not
meeting recognized professional standards. 19 The
lack of medical necessity grounds for denial that
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appear in most overpayment cases corresponds
to the "furnishing services in excess of the
needs of patients" grounds for exclusion. So the
question is whether lack of medical necessity of
our Company's services is, in and of itself, valid
grounds to exclude it, and therefore also exclude
its owners?
These service-related grounds for exclusion are
addressed in the Medicare Program Integrity
Manual (the "PIM") in Chapter 4, Sec. 4.19. This
section states, "In order to prove such cases, the
PSC and the ZPIC BI unit shall document a long-
standing pattern of care where educational contacts
have failed to change the abusive pattern. Isolated
instances and statistical samples are not actionable.
Medical doctors must be willing to testify.2 0
Only these service-related grounds for exclusion
could plausibly be applied to the facts of our
overpayment hypothetical, without serious
wrongdoing beyond simple failure to repay.
The contractor documentation in a typical post-
payment audit would not appear to satisfy the
PIM requirement of "document[ing] a long-
standing pattern of care where educational
contacts have failed to change the abusive
pattern."21 Accordingly, exclusion of the provider
and its individual owner does not appear to be a
substantial risk in the hypothetical.
B. Bars to Subsequent Applications
In the hypothetical, the individual owners will not be
able to continue in the health care industry using the
Company itself as a practice vehicle. They may wish
to organize and capitalize another entity to provide
the same or a similar type of services. What are the
risks that CMS and its contractors might punish the
Company's failure to satisfy its proven overpayment
demand, by barring the enrollment application of the
owner's new provider entity?
In order to bar a new provider owned or controlled
by owners of the hypothetical defaulting provider,
however, CMS and its contractors must be aware of
the relationship between the two companies. So the
initial inquiry must be whether the new-provider
enrollment process will itself call the attention
of CMS or its contractors to the relationship
between the non-paying Company and the new
applicant. This process is largely embodied
in the enrollment application document. The
current form of Medicare enrollment application
for most incorporated providers, CMS-855A
requires disclosure of any "Adverse Legal Actions/
Convictions" of individuals with ownership or
control of the entity.22 The Company's owners
from the hypothetical would therefore be required
to disclose any such as part of the enrollment
application. The listing of adverse adjudications
that constitute Adverse Legal Actions/Convictions
includes most criminal convictions, state license
and government program revocations, suspensions,
exclusions and debarments, as well as "[a]ny
current Medicare payment suspension under any
Medicare billing number."23
This form does not require the new applicant's
owner to disclose the problems of the Company in
the hypothetical, or even mention its existence, for
two reasons. First, "payment suspension" is a very
specific Medicare sanction, and usually not present
in an overpayment demand case. Second, the
disclosure is explicitly directed at the individual
owner, and its wording does not extend it to other
entities under the owner's ownership or control.
Section 6 of the PIM provides the following:
1. Has the individual in Section 6A, under
any current or former name or business
identity, ever had a final adverse legal
action listed on page 16 of this application
imposed against him/her?24
New program developments in Medicare, however,
may change the above situation and extend required
disclosures to entities under common ownership or
control with new applicants. In its 2013 Work Plan,
the HHS OIG proposed the following concerning
oversight of "currently not collectible debt":
[The OlG] will also determine whether
[currently not collectible] debtors are
closely associated with other businesses
that continue to receive Medicare payment.
CMS defines a [currently not collectible]
debt as a Medicare overpayment that
remains uncollected 210 days after the
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provider or supplier is notified of the debt
and for which recovery attempts by CMS
contractors have failed.25
No mention is made in the Work Plan of what, if any,
sanctions HHS is considering against businesses
"closely associated" with defaulting debtors, but
affiliates of debtors defaulting on overpayments are
clearly a topic of concern to the agency. Program
changes on this subject may be forthcoming, and
would logically be brought to bear in the new
provider enrollment process.
Means already exist - such as simple data mining
- for CMS and its contractors to identify other
providers under common ownership with a defaulting
provider.26 With or without changes coming from
the Work Plan, there is a substantial risk that in our
hypothetical, CMS or its contractors would become
aware of the connection between the new application
and the Company's unsatisfied overpayment.
Grounds for denial of enrollment are similar to
grounds for exclusion.27 They include felony
convictions and program debarments, as well as
exclusions of "[a] provider, supplier, an owner,
managing employee, an authorized or delegated
official, medical director, supervising official, or
other health care personnel furnishing reimburseable
Medicare services who is required to be reported
on the enrollment application."28 Further, denial
of enrollment based on an existing overpayment
is expressly mentioned in this regulation: "(6)
Overpayment. The current owner (as defined in
§ 424.502), physician or nonphysician practitioner
has an existing overpayment at the time of filing
of an enrollment application."29 This provision
does not include the Company's overpayment in
our hypothetical as grounds for denial of the new
provider's enrollment, and no other part of the
regulation appears to do so either. So it appears that
even ifCMS or its contractor is aware ofthe affiliation
of the Company and the new entity, it could not deny
the new enrollment. In practice, however, it is highly
likely the agency would strive to find other grounds
for denial in such a case, and the affiliation with the
Company would make enrollment extremely difficult
for the new provider entity. Additionally, changes to
the Medicare enrollment process resulting from the
OIG Work Plan discussed above could include an
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expansion of the grounds for denial of enrollment
to include overpayments by entities under common
control with the applicant.
C. Sanctions Against Companies Under
Common Ownership or Control
If we add to the hypothetical another existing health
care provider business that is incorporated as an
entity separate from the Company but under common
ownership or control, another question arises: what
are the risks that CMS and its contractors might
punish a failure to satisfy a proven overpayment
demand with sanctions against the other existing
Medicare provider entity? In the veil piercing and
successor liability topics above, we noted that such
acts as ignoring the formalities of legal separateness
between the Company and the other provider
entity, and transferring assets between them, can
allow creditors such as CMS and its contractors to
pursue their debt claims against both entities. But as
also noted in that topic, such remedies are hard to
invoke, disfavored by courts in practice, and seldom
used by government agencies. So our inquiry turns
to exclusion of the other entity from government
programs and revocation of its Medicare enrollment.
Section 1320a-7(b)(8) of the Social Security Act
allows incorporated entities to be excluded if a five
percent or more owner or control person has been
excluded. The Company's owners will own the other
entity in our hypothetical, so if the conduct of the
Company were grounds to exclude the owners,
§ 1320a-7(b)(8) would allow the other entity to be
excluded likewise. But as discussed in (a), above,
the PIM exclusion requirements make it unlikely
that the exclusion sanction could be applied in a
normal overpayment case. Likewise, the regulations
governing revocation of enrollment do not identify
an overpayment by a provider under common control
as grounds for revocation.30 Accordingly, no clear
avenue exists under current Medicare law and policy
to exclude or revoke the enrollment of the commonly
owned provider in our hypothetical.
IX. CONCLUSION
In sum, the established legal rule of limited liability
of owners of incorporated businesses appears to be
alive and well in the Medicare service provider area,
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and federal agencies and their contractors by and
large respect it. The separateness of legally distinct
incorporated businesses under common ownership
also remains in effect. However, these rules have
significant exceptions.
Owners of incorporated health care provider entities,
absent some written agreement to the contrary, are
insulated from personal liability for overpayment
obligations owed by their companies to Federal
health care program authorities by the same state
laws which insulate them from their companies'
other debts. Generally, federal health care laws do
not change these rules. If your company's assets are
insufficient to satisfy its debts, procedures exist for
federal claimants (like other creditors) to try to reach
through your company and pursue your personal
credit to satisfy their claims. But this requires a
lawsuit to be filed against you personally; the laws of
the states specify only certain narrow circumstances
where they can be successful. Accordingly, creditors
rarely try to "pierce the corporate veil," and this is
probably more true of federal creditors than private
ones.
The most likely situation where an insolvent
provider's creditor can successfully reach the personal
credit of the owner is when the owner has taken
dividends and other sums from the company which
cannot be characterized as salary or compensation
for employment, at times when the debtor company
was already insolvent. Likewise, the most likely
way a new provider company being organized by
an existing provider's owner can become liable
to its creditors is for assets to be transferred from
the old provider to the new. Owners of multiple
providers should consult legal counsel to examine
all dealings between them for successor liability
and similar issues whenever one provider becomes
liable for overpayments, because many risk-creating
activities will not be recognizable as such without
legal training.
In addition to debt collection risks, HHS can exclude
owners of providers from Federal health care
programs, which operates to exclude other provider
entities under common ownership. The available
grounds for exclusion, however, do not normally arise
in an overpayment case. Similarly, HHS regulations
provide for the revocation of the enrollment of health
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care providers in certain cases. The grounds for
revocation do not include a defaulted overpayment
by a separate provider under common control.
The main area of risk for the affiliates of a defaulting
provider subject to an overpayment is the enrollment
application by a new provider entity under common
ownership. While the strict wording of the current
enrollment application form does not require
disclosure of the overpayment situation in our
hypothetical, and overpayment by a commonly-
owned provider is not currently a listed basis for denial
of the new enrollment, in practice the existence of a
defaulted overpayment obligation poses a substantial
risk to any related party's enrollment. Initiatives are
under way inside HHS that could change these risks
to certainties.
I The term "incorporated" will be used here to refer to the
legal process of creating any form of legal entity providing
limited liability to its owners (e.g. limited partnerships and
LLCs) not just to the creation of a corporation.
2 ZPICs are contractors dedicated to program integrity
by handling functions such as audits, medical reviews,
and potential fraud and abuse investigations consolidated
into a single contract. Medicare Program Integrity
Manual, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
Ex. I (Dec. 28, 2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/
Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/
pim83exhibits.pdf.
RACs focus on identifying and recovering improper
Medicare payments through the efficient detection and
collection of Medicare overpayments. See Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Recovery Audit Program,
CMS.Gov (last updated Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.cms.
gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-
Programs/recovery-audit-program/index.html?redirect=/
rac/. Unlike ZPICs, RACs are paid on a contingency basis
and focus more on fraud.
I CERT contractors measure improper Medicare payments.
The CERT program uses random samples to select claims
and is therefore often unable to label a claim fraudulent.
See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Comprehensive
Error Rate Testing (CERT), CMS.GOV (last updated Mar. 13,
2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-
Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/CERT/index.
html?redirect=/CERT/.
5 See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 418-19
(1966) (refusing to pierce the corporate veil on account of
undercapitalization alone); Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper
Source, 941 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that the
corporate veil will be pierced when there is no separation
between the corporation and its owner and when a fraud or
injustice would result if the veil were not pierced).
6 This practice is harder to defend than a claim for initial
undercapitalization, because in this case there is evidence
that at the time of organization, the owners believed the
capital later taken out was needed in the business.
87
Failure to hold annual meetings or keep corporate minutes
has seldom been the basis for shareholder liability.
II U.S.C. § 362.
11 USC § 362(b)(28)
10 See In re Slater Health Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 98, 104-
05 (1st Cir. 2005) (allowing CMS to recoup money as an
adjustment for a Medicare overpayment, even though the
provider was in bankruptcy). The US Bankruptcy Code
does not explicitly address recoupment, and the Slater
ruling may not apply in all circumstances. Among other
things, its application turns on the overpayment and the new
billing being part of the "same transaction." Otherwise, the
contractor's claim against the new billing is a setoff that is
specifically addressed in the Code and is generally halted in
bankruptcy by the automatic stay. See, e.g., In re University
Medical Center, 973 F.2d 1065, 1073 (3rd Cir 1992)
(holding that a debtor hospital's claim that HHS violated
the automatic stay by withholding payments for Medicare
services rendered after debtor hospital filed for bankruptcy
arose under the Bankruptcy Code).
" Gerri Detweiler, What to Do if You Can't Make Your SBA
Loan Payments, CREDIT.COM (May 30, 2011), http://blog.
credit.com/2 01 1/05/what-to-do-if-you-cant-make-your-sba-
loan-payments/ (explaining that while the Small Business
Administration can seize debtors personal collateral in the
event of a default, in practice it encourages the lending bank
to work out a reasonable settlement).
12 The notable exception to this rule is the Internal Revenue
Service's pursuit of shareholders to collect corporate tax
liability. The IRS has in recent years successfully pierced
the corporate veil in a number of well-publicized cases.
3 In over thirty years of representing participants in
Federal programs, I have never been involved in any case
where such a remedy was sought against a client or any
other individual.
4 See, e.g., Cab-Tek v. E.B.M. Inc., 153 Vt. 432 (Vt. 1990).
5 Typical statements of state successor liability rules can
be found in Marks v. Minn Mining & Mfg. Co., 187 Cal.
App. 3d 1429 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) and Sweatland v. Park
Corp., 587 NYS 2d 54 (App. Div. 1992).
16 42 USC §§ 1320a-7 and 1320c-5.
17 For a helpful chart from HHS OIG that lists all of the
bases for exclusion, see Exclusion Authorities, DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs. (last visited April 8, 2013), https://
oig.hhs.gov/exclusions/authorities.asp.
Is The recurring text appears, for example, in 42 USC §
1320a-7(b)(6). That section provides that the Secretary
of HHS may exclude "Any individual or entity that the
Secretary determines... has furnished or caused to be
furnished ... items or services to patients substantially in
excess of the needs of such patients...." Since owners of a
provider entity are normally in control of it, if the entity has
done the described act, the owner can be said to have caused
the act, and is therefore subject to the same grounds for
exclusion [emphasis added].
19 42 USC § 1320a-7(b)6).
20 Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare
Progran Integrity Manual, CMS.Gov, Ch. 4, § 4.19.2 (Dec.
28, 2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-
and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/pim83cG4.pdf
21 Notably, no practitioner at this health care law firm has
seen exclusion attempted or threatened against the provider
or its owners in a simple overpayment case.
22 See Medicare Enrollment Application: Institutional
Providers, CMS-855A, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES § 6, available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
CMS-Forms/CMS-Forms/downloads/cms855a.pdf
23 See id. at § 15 (extending the required disclosure to all
subsequent periods, effectively making it an Evergreen
requirement).
24 Id. at § 6.
25 Qffice of Inspector General Work Plan: Fiscal Year
2013, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. at 38 (2013),
available at https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/
archives/workplan/2013/Work-Plan-2013.pdf. The OIG's
FY 2012 Work Plan contained an identical provision. See
Office of Inspector General Work Plan: Fiscal Year 2012,
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. at 1-32 (2012), available
at https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/archives/
workplan/2012/Work-Plan-2012.pdf.
26 For example, CMS-855 program application forms have
long required owners of all applicants to be identified by
name and Social Security Number. Cross-checking these
identifiers against identifiers of owners from the CMS-855
of defaulting debtors could easily be implemented.
27 See 42 C.F.R. § 424.530(a); see also Medicare Program
Integrity Manual, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES, Ch. 15.8 (Dec. 28, 2012), available at http://www.
cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/
downloads/pim83cl 5.pdf.
2' 42 CFR § 424.530(2).
29 Id. at § 424.530(6). The regulation defining the term
"owner" includes holders of five percent greater ownership
interests. Grounds for denial of enrollment based on
payment suspension are set forth in nearly identical
language in § 424.530(7).
30 See 42 CFR § 424.535. Note that this revocation
regulation includes a grounds for revocation corresponding
to § 424.530(a)(2) (felony conviction, debarment or
suspension by the provider, its owner or key personnel) but
no grounds for revocation corresponding to § 424.530(a)(6)
(existing overpayment by the provider or its owner).
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